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Casenotes
ACCESS DENIED AND NOT DESIGNED: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DRAFTS A NARROW ESCAPE FOR ARCHITECT LIABILITY
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN
LONBERG v. SANBORN THEATERS, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Super Bowl, the new Brad Pitt flick, Madonna in concert -
all of these are available in the comfort of one's home thanks to TV,
pay-per-view or DVD. 1 Yet, how can this TV experience compare to
cheering your favorite team to victory from the stands, watching
your favorite star on the big screen or feeling the rhythm of a live
performance? Fortunately, Title III of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act ("ADA") mandates that theaters, arenas and stadiums be
equally accessible to all attendees, including those with disabilities. 2
The ADA was adopted to eliminate discrimination against the
millions of Americans with disabilities.a It consists of five titles that
address discrimination in the areas of employment, public services,
private enterprises and telecommunications. 4 This Note focuses on
Title III, "Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private
1. See generally iNDemandm Pay-Per-View, at http://www.ppv.com (last visited
Feb. 22, 2002) (setting forth weblink access to movies, sports and entertainment
events on television and pay-per-view basis); DIRECTVE, at http://www.directv.
com/DTVAPP/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 22, 2002) (providing digital satellite pro-
gramming for sports and entertainment).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (1994).
3. See The Americans With Disabilities Act, The Center for an Accessible Society,
at http://www.accessiblesociety.org/topics/ada/index.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2002) (remarking on impact of ADA on fifty-four million Americans currently with
disabilities).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (1994) (listing and describing titles of ADA).
Title I, "Employment," relates to equal opportunity employment issues and prohib-
its employers from discriminating, based on disability, against qualified individuals
in hiring, compensation, discharge and job assignment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17
(1994). Title II, "Public Services," prohibits public entities from discriminating
when providing access to services, programs, benefits and activities. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131-65 (1994). Further, Title II covers almost every state or local government
program, regardless if it receives federal funding, in areas including transporta-
tion, access to public buildings, public benefits and public employment. See id.
Title III, "Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities," pro-
vides accessibility requirements for privately owned businesses and other establish-
ments. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89. Title IV, "Telecommunications," requires certain
telecommunications systems to provide access for individuals who have impaired
hearing or speech. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (1994). Title V, "Miscellaneous Provi-
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Entities," which directs public access to businesses and other estab-
lishments in the private sector.5 Title III is the segment of the ADA
that is most often applicable in sports and entertainment facility
cases.
6
Since the passage of the ADA in 1990, courts have split on the
issue of whether an architect who designs a public accommodation
or commercial facility is liable under Tide III of the ADA for viola-
tions of accessibility requirements. 7 Some courts assign liability
only to owners, lessees, lessors or operators of public accommoda-
tions and commercial facilities, while other courts extend this liabil-
ity to architects, contractors and franchisors. s Architects of sports
or entertainment facilities often face a unique problem of deter-
mining their potential liability with respect to the ADA.9 In Lonberg
v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc.,1° the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit addressed the dispute surrounding architect liabil-
sions," delineates procedural safeguards, plaintiffs' remedies, retaliation, regula-
tions and alternate dispute resolution. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-13 (1994).
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89.
6. See Katherine C. Carlson, Down in Front: Entertainment Facilities and Disabled
Access Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 897,
904-11 (1998) (explaining Title III application in sports and entertainment related
cases). Title III prohibits discrimination in motion picture houses, theaters, con-
cert halls, stadiums and other places of exhibition or entertainment in order to
ensure that people with disabilities enjoy the same forms of entertainment as the
general population. See id. at 900.
7. Compare United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. ("8th Circuit DIA'), 151 F.3d
822, 826 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding party who possesses significant degree of control
over design and construction of facility liable under Title III of ADA), with
Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by
271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding architects are not liable under Title III of
ADA).
8. Compare 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d at 826 (stating franchisor with extensive
authority over design and construction may be liable), and United States v. Days
Inns of Am., Inc. ("Illinois DIA"), 997 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding
licensing corporation and its parent liable for ADA violations), andJohanson v.
Huizenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1176 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (denying defen-
dant architect's motion to dismiss), and United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F.
Supp. 1262, 1268 (D. Minn. 1997) (concluding that architects are not excluded
from ADA liability as matter of law), with Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1036 (finding liability
not extended to architects under Title III of ADA), and United States v. Days Inns
of Am., Inc. ("Kentucky DIA "), 22 F. Supp. 2d 612, 617 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (refusing to
extend liability under Title III to franchisors), and Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v.
Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., ("PVA I), 945 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996)
(stating Title III does not provide grounds for liability of architects).
9. See DennisJ. Powers & Eric A. Berg, Accessibility: Not Just the Owner's Responsi-
bility, 21 CONSTRUCTION LAw., Spring 2001, at 13-15 (discussing different judicial
decisions and potential consequences for architects, engineers, contractors and
subcontractors).
10. 259 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001).
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ity. I The Ninth Circuit held that the architects of a movie theater
were not subject to liability under Title III of the ADA as a result of
noncompliance with accessibility standards.1 2 Consequently, the
plaintiffs were barred from bringing suit against the architects for
inaccessible design under the ADA. 13
This Note examines the Ninth Circuit's holding in Lonberg in
light of other courts' decisions regarding the liability of parties
other than owners, lessees, lessors and operators.1 4 Part II of this
Note provides the factual setting for the lawsuit against the archi-
tects of Sanborn Theaters.' 5 Part III describes the complex legal
background of architect liability under Title III of the ADA. 16 Part
IV describes the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Lonberg.17 Part V ana-
lyzes the reasoning and examines the conclusions of the Ninth Cir-
cuit. 18 Finally, a discussion of the implications of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Lonberg is elaborated in Part VI.19
II. FACTS
On September 4, 1997, John Lonberg and Ruthie Goldkorn
brought an action against the owners, operators and architects of
the Market Place Cinema ("Market Place"), located in Riverside,
California. 20 Market Place is a multiplex theater containing four
auditorium-style and two stadium-style movie theaters.2 ' Lonberg
11. See id. at 1030. "We must decide whether an architect can be held liable
for designing a movie theater which is not in compliance with the Americans with
Disabilities Act." Id.
12. See id. at 1036 (holding only owner, lessee, lessor or operator of noncomp-
liant public accommodation liable under Title III for discrimination as described
in § 12183(a)).
13. See id. at n.9. (contemplating various scenarios and concluding "there is
still no need to sue the architect").
14. See, e.g., 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating if party
possesses significant degree of control over final design and construction of facil-
ity, then party will be liable under Title III of ADA).
15. For a further discussion of the facts surrounding the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing in Lonberg, see infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the statutory, legislative and judicial framework
of Title III of the ADA, see infra notes 30-106 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the Lonberg court's approach in analyzing the
liability of architects under Title III of the ADA, see infra notes 107-37 and accom-
panying text.
18. For a further discussion of criticisms of the Lonberg court's analysis, see
infta notes 138-71 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion on the potential impact resulting from the
Lonberg court's decision, see infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
20. See Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1030 (9th Cir.
2001), amended by 271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001).
21. See id. (describing layout and location of movie theater).
2002]
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and Goldkorn, both physically disabled and requiring the use of
wheelchairs, claimed Market Place denied sufficient access to peo-
ple using wheelchairs. 22
Lonberg and Goldkorn alleged a number of ADA violations
involving the wheelchair seating area including insufficient space to
accommodate a wheelchair, inadequate lines of sight, lack of com-
panion seats and absence of transfer seats.23 Allegations of ADA
violations outside the movie screening area included inadequate
restroom stalls to accommodate wheelchairs, emergency exits not
large enough to accommodate wheelchairs and emergency exit
ramps too steep to be used safely by persons in wheelchairs. 24
The plaintiffs not only argued that the owners and operators of
Market Place were liable for ADA noncompliance, but additionally,
the architectural firm of Salts, Troutman & Kanshiro, Inc. ("STK")
was liable.2 5 The plaintiffs claimed that STK failed to design and
construct Market Place in a manner that was "'readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities.'- 2 6 STK contended that
liability was limited to only (1) owners, lessees, lessors and opera-
tors, and none of these titles describes STK; and (2) persons who
both design and construct a building, and STK did not construct
Market Place. 27
The question before the Ninth Circuit was whether STK was
liable for "design and construct" discrimination even though STK
22. See id. at n.1. (describing plaintiffs allegations concerning inadequacies of
theater).
23. See id. (noting wheelchair seating area inadequate to service needs of
wheelchair-bound individuals, isolated from general public and inferior to seating
area of general public).
24. See id. (listing violations outside screening area affecting safety of wheel-
chair-bound individuals).
25. See Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1030 (alleging architects liable for failure to design
theater in accordance with ADA accessibility requirements).
The Ninth Circuit addressed STK's motion for partial summary judgment,
which asserted that no violation of the ADA occurred because STK did not design
and construct Market Place. See id. The district court stayed the claims against the
owners and operators of Market Place pending the outcome of substantially similar
litigation elsewhere in the Central District of California. See id. at n.2.
26. Id. at 1030 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)). The plaintiffs' only claim
against STK was for injunctive relief, the remedy provided under Title III of ADA.
See id.
27. See id. The district court rejected STK's first theory, but granted STK par-
tial summary judgment based on the latter. See id. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit
was persuaded by STK's first theory and rejected the latter. See id. at 1036 (holding
that "only an owner, lessee, lessor, or operator of a noncompliant public accom-
modation can be liable under Title III of the ADA for 'design and construct' dis-
crimination described in § 12183(a)").
[Vol. 9: p. 293
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol9/iss2/3
ACCESS TO ENTERTAINMENT AND THE ADA
was not an owner, lessee, lessor or operator of Market Place.28 Al-
though based on a rationale diverging from the district court, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in finding that the archi-
tects were not subject to liability under Title III of the ADA.29
III. BACKGROUND
A. Before the ADA
Although the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 did not cover
people with disabilities, its impact was profound - policy makers
would not tolerate exclusion in American society.3 0 Gradual in-
creases in federal legislation relating to people with disabilities soon
followed, including the Architectural Barriers Act, the Urban Mass
Transportation Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Air Carrier Access
Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act.3 1 Each of these Acts
28. See id. at 1030 (establishing issue of whether architect is liable for design-
ing theater not compliant with ADA).
The Lonberg court also addressed a jurisdictional argument raised by STK. See
id. at 1031. STK argued that the plaintiffs' had filed their notice of appeal fifty
days after the district court judgment had been entered. See id. A party normally
has only thirty days to file notice of appeal under FED. R. App. P. 4(a) (1) (A); how-
ever, there is an exception under 4(a) (1) (B) when the United States is a party, in
which case, all parties have sixty days. See id. The United States filed a complaint
against Sanborn, the owner of Market Place, without joining STK. See id. at 1030-
31. However, the United States intervened in support of the plaintiffs by filing an
amicus curiae brief in this appeal and participating in oral argument. See id. at 1031
n.3. The court noted that a majority of courts have rejected the argument that the
United States must have an actual interest in the appeal. See id. at 1031-32 n.4.
Rather, the court held that the sixty-day deadline is applicable if the United States
is a party to the action at any stage of the litigation. See id. The court noted con-
trary language in one of their cases, but distinguished the case because it was
brought in the context of bankruptcy proceedings. See id.
29. See id. at 1036 (holding architects are not liable but using different ratio-
nale than district court).
30. See Bonnie P. Tucker, The ADA's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil
Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 335, 340-41 (2001) (discussing Congress' motiva-
tion to premise ADA on civil rights paradigm).
31. See Historical Context of the Americans With Disabilities Act, at http://www.
adata.org/whatsada-history.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002) (describing Civil
Rights legislation as establishing statutory foundation on which ADA later con-
structed). In 1968, President Johnson signed The Architectural Barriers Act, re-
quiring federal buildings and facilities to be accessible to people with physical
disabilities. See The Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) of 1968, available at http://www.
access-board.gov/about/ABA.htm (last visited March 27, 2002); see also 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4151-57 (1968). President Nixon later signed the Urban Mass Transportation
Act in 1970, which required that public transportation, to qualify for federal fund-
ing, be accessible for the disabled. See Travel Model Improvement Program: Urban
Transportation Planning in the United States - An Historical Overview available at http:/
/tmip.fhwa.dot.gov/clearinghouse/docs/utp/ch7.stm#7.1 (last visited Feb. 22,
2002); see also Urban Mass Transportation Act, Pub. L. 91-453, 84 Stat. 962 (1970).
President Nixon passed The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, proscribing discrimination
on the basis of disability by recipients of federal funding. See Historical Context of the
2002] 297
5
Chatterjee: Access Denied and Not Designed: The Ninth Circuit Drafts a Narrow
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
298 ViLLANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
eliminated societal barriers faced by people with disabilities, as well
as contributed to the passage of the ADA. 32 Additionally, these fed-
eral mandates shifted the focus from a medical model of disability,
which emphasized rehabilitating only the individual with the disa-
bility, to a social model that sought to rehabilitate all of society. 33
The underlying civil rights paradigm of the ADA signified a
rejection of the medical model of disability and considered disabili-
ties to be a social problem that society as a whole should be respon-
sible for rectifying. 34 Redefining and reorganizing society by
creating accessibility to people with disabilities, however, generates
substantial costs that certain segments of society must incur.3 5
American With Disabilities Act: Origins of Disability Rights Laws, at http://www.adata.
org/whatsada-history.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1973).
In 1986, President Reagan signed the Air Carrier Access Act, prohibiting airlines
from refusing service to people with disabilities and charging them higher fares.
See Air Carrier Access Act, at http://www.access-board.gov/enforcement/
Air%20Carrier%20Access%2OAct.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002). The Fair Hous-
ing Amendment Acts of 1988, also signed by President Reagan, protected people
with disabilities from discrimination in housing. See Historical Context of the Ameri-
can With Disabilities Act: Fair Housing Amendment Acts of 1988 (FHAA), at http://www.
adata.org/whatsada-history.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
For additional chronology of legislation impacting the disabled see Bill Day,
Businesses Find Disabilities Act Has Been a Plus, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 23,
2000, at 1A; Landmarks in the March to Equality For Those With Disabilities Series: Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Sept. 3, 2000, at A19 [hereinaf-
ter Landmarks in the March].
32. See Landmarks in the March, supra note 31, at A19 (providing chronology of
significant social, legislative and judicial achievements involving or affecting peo-
ple with disabilities). See generally Historical Context of the American With Disabilities
Act: Fair Housing Amendment Acts of 1988 (FHAA), at http://www.adata.org/what-
sada-history.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002) (stating that organized movements of
disabled individuals inspired by civil rights struggle and critical to development of
disability policy leading up to and including ADA).
33. See Tucker, supra note 30, at 336 (describing personal experience with
shift from medical to social model of disability). For a further discussion of the
models of disability, see generally Richard K Scotch, Models of Disability and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEvJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 213 (2000).
Enactment of the ADA contributed to enhancing the role of the legal system
within the social model of disability. Congress included in their findings that "un-
like individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color,
sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination." 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (4) (1994).
34. See Tucker, supra note 30, at 336-37 (suggesting law required in which
society takes up necessary expenses to secure accessibility to all).
35. See id. at 352 (noting controversial area during drafting states of ADA was
cost and burden imposed on employers, owners and operators of public accommo-
dations, telecommunication service providers and state and local governments).
Tucker states:
To make the ADA palatable to the business sector, the states, and ulti-
mately our representatives in Congress who are responsive to the con-
cerns of their constituents, the ADA had to be framed in such a manner
[Vol. 9: p. 293
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B. Legislative History of the ADA and Tide III
An overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives and
the Senate voted for the ADA legislation.36 The ADA passed with
the purpose of providing a "clear and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. '3 7 Hailed as the "emancipation proclamation" for the
disabled, the ADA was described as "the most sweeping piece of
civil rights legislation possible in the history of our country .... ,,38
On July 26, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the ADA
into law during an elaborate and emotional White House ceremony
declaring the "act powerful in its simplicity. It will ensure that peo-
ple with disabilities are given the basic guarantees . . . indepen-
dence, freedom of choice, control of their lives, the opportunity to
blend fully and equally into the rich mosaic of the American main-
stream .... Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come tum-
bling down." 39 Ten years later, President Clinton commemorated
the anniversary of the ADA in front of the FDR memorial, declaring
that it did not seem overly disruptive or intrusive. It is highly unlikely that
Congress could have been persuaded to enact a law that outspokenly re-
quired the business sector and state and local governments to provide
special entitlements to people with disabilities. The ultimate objective of
the ADA, however, is just that.
Id. This theory may explain judicial decisions that narrow the scope of the ADA.
See id. at 353. Courts may view special accommodations and entitlements as a step
beyond a traditional nondiscrimination policy of civil rights laws in which the ADA
was modeled. See id.
36. See 135 CONG. REc. 17,251, 17,280 (1990). The vote in the House of Rep-
resentatives was 355-58. See id., see also 136 CONG. REc. 17,364, 17,376 (1990) (in-
dicating vote in Senate was 91-6).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1). The stated purpose of the ADA includes:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elim-
ination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to insure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforc-
ing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals
with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce,
in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day
by people with disabilities.
Id.
38. James P. Colgate, Note, If You Build It, Can They Sue? Architect's Liability
Under Title III of the ADA, 68 FoRDHsM L. REv. 137, 140 (1999) (quoting 135 CONG.
REc. 19,833, 19,847 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch)).
39. President George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1990/
90072600.html (July 26, 1990).
20021
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that "[w]e are all a freer, better country because of the ADA."'40
Despite the landmark legislation, progress in applying the ADA has
been slower than many people had hoped.41
Congressional findings revealed that the greater part of the dis-
abled population lead isolated lives and "do not go to movies, do
not go to the theatre, do not go to see musical performances, and
do not go to sporting events."42 They found that individuals with
disabilities continually encounter the discriminatory effects of ar-
chitectural barriers that prohibit them from enjoying these activi-
ties.43 Congress determined that to grant disabled individuals civil
rights and equal opportunities, a provision of reasonable accommo-
dations would be necessary to integrate people with disabilities into
mainstream society.44
Congress hoped to legislate clear and enforceable standards to
facilitate such integration.45 Pursuant to this goal, the ADA defines
disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities, having a record of such impair-
ment or being regarded as having such impairment.46 Additionally,
recognition of "the deleterious effects of discrimination against
people with disabilities" in their everyday lives instigated the adop-
tion of Title III of the ADA. 47 In passing Title III, Congress sought
to provide people with disabilities access to movies, theaters and
sporting events by ensuring that public facilities would accommo-
40. President and Mrs. Clinton's Remarks at the 10th Anniversary of the ADA,
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/able/07260004.htm (July 26, 2000).
41. See Tucker, supra note 30, at 335, 341-43 (2001) (discussing the education
of courts and public-at-large concerning meaning of civil rights as it pertains to
people with disabilities); see also Day, supra note 31, at 1A (remarking on study
demonstrating public's confusion regarding disabled in workplace).
42. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 34 (1990) (citing National Council on
Disability).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). Congress found that:
individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of dis-
crimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory
effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers,
overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to ex-
isting facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and cri-
teria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities,
benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.
Id.
44. See generally Wayne L. Anderson & Mary Lizbeth Roth, Deciphering the Amer-
icans With Disabilities Act, 51 J. Mo. B. 142 (May/June 1995).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2). For the text of this section of the ADA, see
supra note 37.
46. See id. at § 12102(2) (defining disability as used in ADA to determine
plaintiff standing).
47. Carlson, supra note 6, at 900.
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date them.48 With reasonable or readily achievable accommoda-
tions, therefore, people with disabilities could experience
entertainment in the same manner as the general population.49
Soon after the passage of the ADA, commentators noted that Title
III "created more conflicts in implementation than any other aspect
of the ADA."50
Implementation of Title III necessitates certain sectors of soci-
ety to bear the cost of reasonable accommodations as part of an
overall business expenditure, thus allowing people with disabilities
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (c) (1994). A detailed list of public accommoda-
tions covered under this section of the ADA includes:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an estab-
lishment located within a building that contains not more than five
rooms for rent or hire...;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other
place of exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of
public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping
center, or other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel ser-
vice, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an ac-
countant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of
a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate
private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank,
adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of
exercise or recreation.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2) (stating "[t]he term 'commer-
cial facilities' means facilities -(A) that are intended for nonresidential use; and
(B) whose operations will affect commerce").
49. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 901 (stating Title III sought to remedy statis-
tics showing "large majority of people with disabilities do not go to the movies, do
not go to the theater, do not go to musical performances and do not go to sporting
events").
50. Paul M. Anderson, Spoiling a Good Walk: Does the ADA Change the Rules of
Sport?, I VA. J. SPORTS & L. 44, 50 (1999) (quotingJohn W. Parry, Public Accommoda-
tion Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disabil-
ity, 16 MErTAL & PHYSiCAL DISABILYr L. REP. 92 (1992)); see also PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1892 (2001) (finding Title III of ADA applies to profes-
sional sports); Tucker, supra note 30, at 360 (noting courts limit Tide III to "physi-
cal premises of public accommodations, not programs or activities of such public
accommodations"). Additionally, Tucker notes finding architects not liable under
Title III as another example of judicially imposed limits of the ADA. See Tucker,
supra note 30, at 360.
2002]
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to take part in mainstream society. 51 Congress has given the Attor-
ney General full authority to enforce ADA legislation and provided
a private right of action to individuals seeking injunctive relief.52
In assessing the standard of noncompliance of accessibility re-
quirements, Congress acknowledged a distinct variation between
the compliance of existing public accommodations within section
302(a) and that of newly constructed public accommodations and
commercial facilities within section 303 (a) of the ADA.53 Congress
presumed that accessibility for existing places of public accommo-
dation would be difficult and therefore mandated modifications
"readily achievable" by their owners, lessees, lessors or operators. 54
51, See Tucker, supra note 30, at 352. The ADA had to be framed in such a
manner to not seem overly intrusive. See id.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)-(b) (1994) (allowing injunctive relief and de-
lineating Attorney General's enforcement powers). In addition to the statute, the
Attorney General has issued regulations for implementation in the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (1994). But see Carlson, supra note 6, at
898 (demonstrating newness of case law addressing ADA enforcement may be in-
sufficient to rely on).
53. See Colgate, supra note 38, at 145 (citing H. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 63
(1990) because existing places of accommodation must be accessible to disabled to
extent that modifications are readily achievable and newly constructed commercial
facilities must be accessible).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (2002). The statutory term of "readily achieva-
ble" is defined as "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much
difficulty or expense." Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a) (2001). The ADA regula-
tions provide examples of readily achievable steps such as:
(1) Installing ramps;
(2) Making curb cuts in sidewalks and entrances;
(3) Repositioning shelves;
(4) Rearranging tables, chairs, vending machines, and other furniture;
(5) Repositioning telephones;
(6) Adding raised markings on elevator control buttons;
(7) Installing flashing alarm lights;
(8) Widening doors;
(9) Installing offset hinges to widen doorway;
(10) Eliminating a turnstile or providing an alternative accessible path;
(11) Installing accessible door hardware;
(12) Installing grab bars and toilet stalls;
(13) Rearranging toilet partitions to increase maneuvering space;
(14) Insulating lavatory pipes under sinks to prevent burns;
(15) Installing a raised toilet seat;
(16) Installing a full-length bathroom mirror;
(17) Repositioning the paper towel dispenser in the bathroom;
(18) Creating designated accessible parking spaces;
(19) Installing an accessible paper cup dispenser at an existing inaccessi-
ble water fountain;
(20) Removing high pile, low-density carpet;
(21) Installing vehicle hand controls.
Id.; see also Powers & Berg, supra note 9, at 16 (stating that "full compliance is not
required where an entity can demonstrate that it is structurally impracticable to
meet requirements of the ADA").
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However, all new construction of commercial facilities, including
new places of public accommodation, would be designed and con-
structed consistent with accessibility requirements for persons with
disabilities.55
C. Title III as Applied to the Liability of Parties
1. ADA sections 302(a) and 303(a)
Sections 302(a) and 303(a) of the ADA, codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(a) and § 12183(a), have produced differing judicial inter-
pretations of who is liable for ADA noncompliance. 56 Section
302(a) states that "any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation" cannot discriminate on
the basis of disability. 57 Additionally, section 302(a) necessitates
owners, lessees, lessors and operators of public accommodations to
act affirmatively in the removal of "readily achievable" architectural
barriers.58
In contrast, section 303(a) requires a stringent standard of
"readily accessible .. .and usable" for any newly constructed or al-
tered facility, including both new places of public accommodation
and new commercial facilities. 59 Whereas section 302(a) explicitly
states "any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
55. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 901. "In existing facilities... where retrofit-
ting may prove costly, a less rigorous degree of accessibility is required than in the
case of new construction and alterations where accessibility can be more conve-
niently and economically incorporated in the initial stages of design and construc-
tion." Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35, 568 (1991). "Because it costs far less
to incorporate accessible design into the planning and construction of new build-
ings and of alterations, a higher standard of 'readily accessible and useable by'
persons with disabilities has been adopted in the ADA for new construction and
alterations." H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. III, at 60 (1990).
56. See Colgate, supra note 38, at 138-39 (contrasting broad purpose of ADA
with narrow court interpretations). The strict interpretations of the ADA have cre-
ated "the growing trend of a judicial backlash against the ADA and civil rights laws
in general." Id. at 139. The judicial trend toward plain-meaning construction
.often goes so far as to contradict Congress' plainly-stated intent." Id. at 143.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) ("No individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place
of public accommodations.").
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (stating if readily achievable barrier is not
removed, finding discrimination on basis of disability exists).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (1994). Congress has imposed a higher standard of
accessibility on design and construction of public accommodations and commer-
cial facilities after the enactment of the ADA. See id. Section 303(a), codified as
§ 12183(a), states:
As applied to public accommodations and all other new commercial facil-
ities, discrimination for the purposes of 302(a) includes-
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place of public accommodations" is liable under its provisions, lia-
bility under section 303(a), however, is not as clear.60  Section
303(a) defines discrimination as a failure to design and construct
public accommodations and commercial facilities in a manner that
is accessible and usable; however, it does not distinctly name liable
parties in the same manner as section 302(a) .61 The dispute con-
cerning architect liability centers on this discrepancy.62
Architects, contractors and franchisors argue against liability
under (1) the plain language of section 303 because they do not
both design and construct the facilities, and (2) the parallel inter-
pretation of liability for section 303 because they do not own, lease
or operate the facilities. 63 Nonetheless, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") has established, through its Technical Assistance Manual
("TAM"), that "any party with a significant degree of control over
the design and construction of a facility - including architects, con-
tractors, and in some instances, franchisors - can be held liable for
failing to comply with the ADA's standards. ' 64
(1) a failure to design and construct facilities for first occupancy later
than 30 months afterJuly 26, 1990 that are readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities . . .and
(2) ... a failure to make alterations in such a manner that, to the maxi-
mum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities....
Id.
60. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), with 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a).
61. See Powers & Berg, supra note 9, at 14 (tracing court decisions addressing
interplay of sections 302(a) and 303(a) in determining contractor, architect and
franchisor liability).
62. See William L. Killion & Gregory R. Mertz, Franchisor Liability for Failure by
Franchisees to Comply With the Americans With Disabilities Act: Uncertain State of Law, 19
FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 149 (2000) (discussing court split in determining franchisor
liability); Powers & Berg, supra note 9, at 13 (discussing various holdings in archi-
tect, franchisor and contractor liability); Colgate, supra note 38, at 145 (discussing
court split in statutory interpretation regarding architect liability).
63. See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. ("California DIA"), 8 Am. Disa-
bilities Cas. (BNA) 491, 493 (E.D. Cal., Jan. 12, 1998) (stating party must design
and construct public accommodation to be liable for ADA noncompliance under
[section] 303 (a)); Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615-16 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (stating
franchisors do not have sufficient control over design and construction to be classi-
fied as "operator" and thus liable under ADA).
64. 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d at 826 (stating party that possesses significant
degree of control over facility design and construction faces liability under Title III
of ADA); see United States Department of Justice, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILI-
TIES ACT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 111-5.1000 (1993), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3.html; see also Adam A. Milani, "Oh, Say, Can I See -
And Who Do I Sue If I Can't?": Wheelchair Users, Sightlines Over Standing Spectators, and
Architect Liability Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 52 FLA. L. REv. 523, 574
(2000) (noting some courts find architects and contractors not liable under ADA,
but DOJ states otherwise in TAM).
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Courts addressing architect liability have two different ap-
proaches: a parallel interpretation approach based on the statute or
a significant degree of control approach based on the DOJ inter-
pretation. 65 Under the parallel interpretation approach, courts re-
ject liability of architects pursuant to a narrow textual
interpretation of the relevant sections of the ADA.6 6 Courts that
adopt a significant degree of control approach extend liability to
architects by using a broad textual viewpoint relied on by the
DOJ.6 7 Both sides justify their approaches by analyzing statutory
construction, legislative history and public policy concerns.68
2. Courts' Approaches Before Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc.
a. Cases Holding ADA's "Design and Construct" Language Does
Not Cover Architects
Although recognizing architect involvement in design and con-
struction, many courts have chosen to limit liability for the "failure
to design and construct" ADA-compliant buildings (i.e., section
303(a) violators) only to those parties specified in section 302(a). 69
These courts have interpreted both sections as a whole and ascribed
no liability to architects.70 These courts, therefore, have held that
only owners, lessees, lessors and operators of either public accom-
modations or commercial facilities are liable under Title III for "design
and construct" discrimination. 71
65. See Colgate, supra note 38, at 146-47 (discussing contradictory theories of
architect liability under ADA).
66. See Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (refusing to find franchisors liable
under Title III because involvement with franchise not equivalent to that of opera-
tor); PVA I, 945 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (refusing to find architects liable
under Title III because not an owner, operator, lessor or lessee).
67. See, e.g., 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d at 826 (adhering to plain language and
deferring to DOJ interpretation of statute to conclude party found liable if possess
significant degree of control over final design of facility); Illinois DIA, 997 F. Supp.
1080, 1085 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (finding conjunctive reading of "design and construct"
does not restrict liability of licensing corporation and its parent); Johanson v. Hui-
zenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1176 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (denying architect
defendant's motion to dismiss).
68. See, e.g., PVA I, 945 F. Supp. at 2 (noting court's interpretation does not
frustrate intent of statutory scheme).
69. Id. at 1 (holding limitation of liable parties listed in section 302 applies to
303); see also Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (finding that reference in section
303 to section 302 indicates intention to continue same scope of liability).
70. See PVA I, 945 F. Supp. at 2 (discussing architect exclusion from liability).
71. See PVA 1, 945 F. Supp. at 2 (discussing plain language of both sections
limits liable parties to owners, lessors, lessees, and operators); Kentucky DIA, 22 F.
Supp. 2d at 617 (discussing that finding franchisors liable under section 303 con-
trary to congressional intent because statute limited to owners, operators, lessors,
and lessees of public accommodations and commercial facilities). For further dis-
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In Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Ellerbe Becket Architects and Engi-
neers, P. C. ("PVA I"),72 for example, the district court held that an
architect may not be liable under section 303(a) under a dual anal-
ysis: (1) architects are not proper defendants in a Title III action
because such actions are limited to include only those persons who
both "design and construct" a facility, and (2) liability is limited to
owners, lessees, lessors or operators. 73 The court reasoned that its
holding did not frustrate the ADA's intent because "[i]f entities
who are responsible for both design and construction can be held
liable for violations of the ADA, those entities will ensure that the
firms or individuals with whom they contract - experts in design or
construction - will hew to the dictates of the statute and
regulations. '7 4
Following PVA l's design and construct analysis, the Eastern
District of California, in United States v. Days Inns of America,75 nar-
rowly interpreted the plain language of section 303(a) to insulate
from liability anyone who does not both "design and construct."7 6
The California DIA and PVA I decisions do not address a limitation
based on a parallel interpretation of liability; rather, they are nar-
rowly constructing the conjunctive use of "and" in determining that
parties are liable only if they both "design and construct" a noncom-
pliant entity.
77
Aligning with PVA Ts parallel interpretation analysis, the East-
ern District of Kentucky, in United States v. Days Inns of America,78
construed the specified liable parties of section 302 (i.e. owners,
cussion of gap in coverage argument, see infra notes 144-46 and accompanying
text.
72. 945 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996). Plaintiffs' allegations involve the design
and construction of the MCI Center, a sports and multi-purpose arena in Washing-
ton D.C. See id.
73. See id. The court stated that "the phrase 'design and construct' is dis-
tinctly conjunctive [and] refers only to parties responsible for both functions, such
as general contractors or facilities owners who hire the necessary design and con-
struction experts for each project." Id. The court generalized that most architects,
including the defendants, were involved in the design aspect, not construction,
and thus were not liable under section 303(a). See id. The court rejected the
DOJ's argument of interpreting section 303 based on the Chevron analysis. See id.
For a discussion of the Chevron analysis, see infra 158-62 and accompanying text.
74. PVA I, 945 F. Supp. at 2.
75. 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491 (E.D. Cal., Jan. 12, 1998).
76. See id. at 493 (holding one must design and construct to be liable). The
broader view holds that design and construct should be read functionally as "de-
sign or construct," so that either the designer or constructor may be liable. See id.
77. See PVA I, 945 F. Supp. at 2 (emphasis added) (stating that phrase "design
and construct" is conjunctive, thus refers only to parties responsible for both
functions).
78. 22 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
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lessors, lessees and operators of public accommodations) as those
liable under section 303.79 The district court reasoned that
"[flailing to use section 302 as a guidepost for liability would result
in the consequence of an illogical limit to the reach of [section]
303."8o The district court also noted that using language such as
"design and construct" may extend liability to subcontractors,
materials suppliers and similar entities, which goes against Congres-
sional intent.81 Finally, the district court noted that sections 302
and 303 were initially drafted as one section and subsequently sepa-
rated to create a broader group of new buildings subject to ADA
compliance.8 2
b. Cases Holding ADA's "Design and Construct" Language Can
Cover Architects
In United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc.,83 the District Court for the
District of Minnesota held that architects can be liable under the
ADA.84 The district court used the legislative history, which indi-
cated that Congress specifically designed the term "commercial fa-
cilities" in section 303(a) to cover those structures not defined
under "public accommodation" in section 302(a), and maintained
that the two sections should be read separately.85 Additionally, the
district court relied on the canon that "[s] tatutory language should
be construed in a manner that gives effect to all terms so as to avoid
rendering terms useless. '8 6 Because section 302(a) liability is
79. See id. at 617. "Based on the similarities in the purpose and in the drafting
of [sections] 302 and 303, it is apparent to this Court that Congress intended to
limit liability under [section] 303 to owners, operators, lessors, lessees." Id. at 615.
But see Colgate, supra note 38, at 158-59 (explaining Congress may have intention-
ally created broader class of buildings subject to compliance under section 303 and
thus broadened scope of liable parties). Colgate especially points to those parties
in significant control of new design and construction of public accommodations
and commercial facilities. See id.
80. Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
81. See id. But see 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 1998) (limiting
liability to those parties with significant control, not just tangentially connected).
82. See Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 615. The court followed the Sixth
Circuit holding that "when two or more statutes deal with the same subject, they
are to be read in pari materia and harmonized if possible." Id. at 615-16 (quoting
Jones v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 728 F.2d 257, 262 (6th Cir. 1984)). The
court noted: "Had Congress intended to extend liability further in [section] 303, it
could have easily done so. Instead [section] 303 is devoid of any additional entry
that is subject to compliance with ADA standards." Id. at 616.
83. 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997).
84. See id. at 1268 (following DOJ's interpretation of statute).
85. See id. at 1267 (discussing Congress' intent to expand section 303(a) lia-
bility).
86. Id. (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990)).
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ascribed to owners, operators, lessors and lessees of public accommo-
dations, defendant Ellerbe's interpretation would result in a gap of
liability for commercial facilities.87 The significance of including
the term "commercial facilities" in section 303(a), therefore, is ren-
dered useless.18
In United States v. Days Inns of America,89 the circuit court re-
jected such an interpretation, explaining that "by rendering mean-
ingless section 303's inclusion of commercial facilities, DIA's
interpretation of section 303 would result in an inexplicable gap in
coverage of buildings that Congress clearly intended to include."90
Instead, the Eighth Circuit advanced the significant degree of con-
trol approach to determine if a party was liable for "design and con-
struct" discrimination. 91 The Eighth Circuit was careful to give
effect to the plain language of the statute and to defer to the DOJ's
interpretation of the statute.92 The Eighth Circuit, however, did
import limitations because the party must be in significant control,
not just remotely or tangentially connected. 93
Credible arguments persuade broad interpretations of "design
and construct."94 In Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc.,95 for exam-
ple, the Southern District of Florida rejected PVA I's conjunctive
approach of "design and construct" in its analysis for denying the
defendants' motion to dismiss. 96 Requiring both design and con-
struction is inconsistent with Title III because it "gives standing
87. See id. (noting Ellerbe's interpretation would undercut their "plain lan-
guage" logic).
88. See Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267 (explaining Congress clearly in-
tended to include different standards of liability in section 303(a)).
89. 151 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998).
90. Id. at 825.
91. See id. at 826 (holding liable party must possess significant degree of con-
trol over final design and construction of facility to bear responsibility under
ADA).
92. See id.
93. See id. ("Clearly, not any party tangentially or remotely connected with the
design and construction of a facility sustains liability if the facility is ultimately con-
structed in violation of the ADA.").
94. See Colgate, supra note 38, at 149 (examining textual interpretation of
ADA); see also United States' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss at 13, United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn.
1997) (No. 4-96-995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/minnl.txt (argu-
ing Congress' deliberate use of "design" shows intent to include designers as a
liable party).
95. 963 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Plaintiffs brought suit against Broward
Arena, which had been designed but not yet constructed. Id. at 1176.
96. See id. at 1177-78 (noting plaintiffs brought suit before construction had
begun, believing they had reasonable grounds because architectural firm Ellerbe
Becket had designed several other arenas violating ADA).
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both to parties already injured and to those who have 'reasonable
grounds for believing that [they are] about to be subjected to dis-
crimination in violation of [the new construction provision of Title
III of the ADA]." 97
In United States v. Days Inns of America ("Illinois DIA") ,98 the Cen-
tral District of Illinois also rejected the holding of PVA I and found
a narrow construction "inappropriate to carry out the intent of the
ADA." 99 Although the court agreed that the phrase "design and
construct" is distinctly conjunctive, it could still be read conjunc-
tively without being read quite so narrowly.100 The court also stated
that the franchisors "cannot shirk responsibility for following fed-
eral law in its ongoing involvement in the design and construction
of hotels."101
c. Congressional Intent and Deference to DOJ Interpretation
In PVA I, the DOJ submitted an amicus brief arguing that its
interpretation of section 303 should be awarded the deference de-
scribed by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.10 2 The PVA Icourt rejected this argument,
finding "such deference only arises when the statute is ambigu-
ous."1 03 The court also found that if Congress' intent is unambigu-
ous, the Chevron analysis does not apply.104 The PVA I court found
no ambiguity in the plain language of the statute or in congres-
sional intent and held that architects were not covered by section
97. Id. at 1177 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)(1994)); see also Colgate,
supra note 38, at 150. Colgate elaborates on the DOJ's contention that if PVA I's
approach is adopted, an owner or constructor can freely depart from an accessible
design originally in compliance, because the violation had only occurred in the
construction phase. See id.
98. 997 F. Supp. 1080 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
99. See id. at 1083 (finding narrow reading of liability not necessary just be-
cause phrase "design and construct" is conjunctive).
100. See id. at 1082. "'Design and construct' enforce each other in that those
who design or construct also construct and design." Id.
101. Id. at 1083. "'Design and construct' is a broad sweep of liability, it in-
cludes architects, builders, planners and most definitely national hotel licensing
corporations which exist for the sole purpose of ensuring that new hotels are de-
signed and constructed in accordance with acceptable standards." Id.
102. SeePVA I, 945 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 767 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). In Chevron, the
Court found that judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute cannot be substi-
tuted if a delegated agency's interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron, 767 U.S. at
841.
103. PVA 1, 945 F. Supp. at 2.
104. See id. (noting when statute is unclear or ambiguous, agency interpreta-
tion is given deference).
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303 of the ADA. 10 5 The Eighth Circuit, however, found the statute
to be ambiguous and justified the Chevron analysis because a plain
language interpretation would render terms useless. 10 6
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYsis
In Lonberg, the Ninth Circuit considered whether an architect
could be held liable under Title III of the ADA for the "design and
construct" discrimination described in section 303(a). 10 7 First, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted section 302(a) as a "general rule" of the
ADA.108 Then, the court examined the unique and complex legis-
lative history of the ADA. 109 As a result, the court determined the
real issue was whether architects can be liable for "design and con-
struct" discrimination even though they are not one of the entities
- owners, lessees, lessors or operators - to whom liability is ex-
tended by the "general rule" under section 302 (a). 110 The circuit
court continued by discussing the primary approaches used by
other courts in determining liable parties."' Ultimately, the court
concluded that only the "owner, lessee, lessor or operator of a
noncompliant public accommodation" or commercial facility could
be liable for the "design and construct" discrimination described in
section 303.112 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that architects are
not subject to liability under Title III of the ADA." 3
105. See id. (discussing no need to apply Chevron analysis because Congress
made itself clear through plain language of statute).
106. See 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting judicial
responsibility to defer to reasonable statutory interpretation of agency charged
with its enforcement). The Eighth Circuit stated that Congress clearly intended
new commercial facilities be held to ADA accessibility standards. See id. at 826.
Deference to the DOJ interpretation that any party significantly involved in design
and construction is liable embraces Congress' intent without rendering useless
terms. Id.
107. See Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1030 (9th Cir.
2001), amended by 271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001) (examining issue of architect
liability).
108. For a discussion of the Lonberg court's general rule analysis, see infra
notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of the Lonberg court's review of the legislative history, see
infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
110. See Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1032 (discussing court's identification of issue
centers around statutory interpretation concerning liability of architects).
111. For a discussion of the Lonberg court's assessment of other approaches,
see infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
112. Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1036 (discussing holding that architects are exempt
from liability).
113. See id.
[Vol. 9: p. 293
18
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol9/iss2/3
ACCESS TO ENTERTAINMENT AND THE ADA
A. General Rule Analysis
The Ninth Circuit construed section 302(a) as the general rule
to be applied to the subsequent sections of Title III. 1 4 The court
discussed the plaintiffs' argument that section 303(a) violations ex-
tend to anyone who designs and constructs a noncompliant build-
ing, rather than only to the parties listed in section 302(a). 115 The
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that if liability is strictly limited
to those identified in section 302(a), a gap would exist in coverage
to commercial facilities.' 16 Rather than acceding that a gap in com-
mercial facility compliance would result, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that the general rule, as applied to public accommodations,
would also apply to commercial facilities. 117 The court noted that
two approaches have developed to reconcile the ascription of liabil-
ity to architects and opted for the parallel interpretation.' 18
B. Legislative History Analysis
The Ninth Circuit also discussed the complex legislative history
of the ADA, concluding that Congress gave no indication that the
parties liable under section 302(a) are any different than the par-
ties liable under section 303(a).1 19 According to the Ninth Circuit,
the two sections had been separated, and a "clarification" was ad-
ded to section 302(a) in the final bill. 120 The clarification consti-
tuted the addition of language specifying that "any person who
114. See id. at 1032-33 (establishing "general rule" structure of ADA). The
court's analysis of Titles 1, 11 and III of the ADA suggests that the text of each title
follows the same basic structure. See id. at 1032. One provision sets forth a rule of
liable parties, and subsequent provisions set forth what actions are discriminatory,
and thus, prohibited. See id. Following this structure, the court reasoned that sec-
tion 302 is the general rule under which parties are liable, and all other sections
simply describe actions that are prohibited. See id. at 1032-33.
115. See id. at 1033-34 (arguing against court's adoption of section 302(a) as
general rule because resulting gap in coverage for commercial facilities). The
plaintiffs contend that liable parties under section 302 are owners, lessors, lessees
and operators of public accommodations. See id. No party, therefore, is liable for
noncompliant commercial facilities specified in section 302. See id.
116. See id. at 1035 (concluding that Congress wanted section 302(a) to be
applied to section 303(a)).
117. See Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1035 (noting although evidence fails to perfectly
align in its favor, parallel approach allows general rule formulation to stand).
118. See id. at 1034-36. For a thorough discussion of these approaches, see
supra notes 69-101 and accompanying text.
119. See id. at 1035 n.7 (describing bill originally contained only one section
and did not specify who could be liable for discrimination under Title III). The
final bill was separated to make a distinction between the level of compliance for
public accommodations and commercial facilities. See id.
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owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommo-
dation."121 The court acknowledged arguments that this separation
demonstrated that Congress only wanted section 302(a) to be lim-
ited by the subsequent clarification. 122 The court was persuaded,
however, that inserting a provision as a "clarification," rather than
declaring a substantive amendment, meant Congress wanted this
provision to apply to both sections. 123
C. Significant Degree of Control vs. Parallel Interpretation
The Ninth Circuit discussed the two different approaches used
by other courts. 124 The Ninth Circuit rejected the significant de-
gree of control approach because that application "created a cate-
gory of liability found nowhere in the text or legislative history of
the ADA ... "125 The court analyzed the parallel interpretation
approach and concluded that "[a]lthough the evidence does not
perfectly align in its favor, the 'parallel' interpretation is more con-
sistent with the text and structure of the statute."'1 26
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit supported parallel interpretation
because this view conformed to the general rule structure of the
other titles of the ADA. 127 According to the court, a general rule of
liability sets forth who may be liable for discrimination, and subse-
quent provisions describe what constitutes discrimination. 128 Al-
though it acknowledged the Eighth Circuit's reasoning for
following the DOJ interpretation and applying the significant de-
gree of control approach, the Ninth Circuit rejected this approach
because it "divine [d] liability wholly divorced from the text of the
statute."129
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
122. See Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1035 n.7 (citing Colgate, supra note 38, at 158-
59).
123. See id. (noting other commentators agree that Congress wanted provi-
sion to apply to both sections).
124. See id. at 1034-36 (comparing parallel interpretation and significant de-
gree of control approaches).
125. Id. at 1034 (citing 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 1998);
accord Illinois DIA, 997 F. Supp. 1080, 1084-85 (C.D. Ill. 1998); United States v.
Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. at 1262, 1267-68 (D. Minn. 1997);Johanson v.
Huizenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1177-78 (S.D. Fla. 1997)).
126. Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1034-35 (citing Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d 612,
615-16 (E.D. Ky. 1998); CaliforniaDIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491,493 (E.D.
Cal.,Jan. 12, 1998); PVA I, 945 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996)).
127. See Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1035; see also supra notes 114-18 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Ninth Circuit's general rule analysis.
128. See Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1032-33 (discussing general structure of titles in
ADA conform to one another).
129. Id. at 1034 (stating Eighth Circuit's decision goes beyond general rule).
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Furthermore, the court noted that private actions under Tide
III are limited to injunctive relief.130 The court stated that this limi-
tation is significant because injunctive relief only offers a remedy
against the party in current control of the building. 3 1 Because ar-
chitects, builders and construction subcontractors are out of the
picture by the time a plaintiff brings suit, the court found that the
statute provides no meaningful remedy against these parties. 132 Al-
though the Ninth Circuit contemplated cases of pre-construction,
in which architects and contractors may still be involved, the court
found a building could be enjoined effectively by suing its owner,
lessee, lessor or operator. 133 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit
granted partial summary judgment to STK. 3 4
D. Deference to DOJ Interpretation
Lastly, the court considered the plaintiffs' argument that defer-
ence should be given to the DOJ's interpretation of its regulations,
suggesting architects who do not own, lease or operate a building
can be held liable. 135 The plaintiffs argued that the relevant sec-
tions are ambiguous, and a Chevron analysis should be used.' 3 6 The
court concluded, however, that the statute was unambiguous; thus,
Chevron deference was not warranted.
13 7
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. General Rule Analysis
In support of its position that 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (section 303)
pertains only to those parties listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (section
130. See id. at 1036 (noting aside from suits brought by Attorney General, pri-
vate actions under Title III are limited to injunctive relief).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Lonberg 259 F.3d at 1036 (discussing irrelevance of suing architect
because all meaningful violations can be remedied by owner, lessee, lessor and
operator).
134. See id. (granting partial summaryjudgment because STK cannot be held
liable for failure to design and construct). However, the court suggested that its
holding did not preclude STK's liability to Sanborn Theaters, Inc. under tort or
contract law for designing a theater not compliant with ADA. See id. at n.10.
135. See Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2001),
amended by 271 F.3d 953, 954 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering TAM guidelines that
state any entity involved in design and construction including architect or con-
struction contractor may be held liable).
136. See Lonberg 271 F.3d at 954 (discussing application of Chevron analysis to
statute). For a further discussion of courts considering the application of a Chevron
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302), the Ninth Circuit in Lonberg contended that section 302 sets
forth the "general rule" of Title III of the ADA, and thus, defines
the coverage of all other provisions of Title 111.138 The United
States, in its reply brief to the district court, supported the plain-
tiffs' position and claimed that the statute had been misread and
misinterpreted by STK.R 3 9 The United States demonstrated that
section 302 provides the "general rule" for section 302 only, not for
the other Title III provisions. 140 Indeed, section 302(a) "fleshes out
the general rule of section 302 by providing its own examples of the
discrimination" otherwise prohibited under this section.' 4'
Although it is proper to read section 302 as defining the cov-
ered entities within it, construing section 302 as a general rule for
all of Title III is inappropriate because other provisions of Title III
are titled "general rule.' 42 In particular, Congress used the title
"general rule" freely, rather than for the purpose of establishing a
single general rule for all provisions of Title III.143
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit countered the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the general rule analysis results in a gap in coverage by
extending liability to those who own, lease and operate commercial
facilities and public accommodations. 4 4 Judicial transference of
138. See Lonberg 259 F.3d at 1033 (citing PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.
661, 674-78, 682 (2001)). The Ninth Circuit is flawed in its application of the
Martin case, because Martin involves only section 302 of Title III. See Martin, 534
U.S. at 674-78, 682. The Supreme Court applied the general rule of section 302
and the comprehensive definition of "public accommodation" in section 302 to
hold that the petitioners' golf tours and their qualifying rounds fit within the cov-
erage of Title III, entitling Martin to Title III protection under section 302. See id.
at 676. The events occurred on "golf courses," a public accommodation specifi-
cally identified within the ADA. See id. at 677 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L)
(2001)).
139. Reply Brief For the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appel-
lants and Urging Reversal at 4, Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029
(9th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-56221), amended by 271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/lonbergrep.htm.
140. See id. (discussing defendant's argument based simply on use of "General
Rule" as title to provision).
141. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2001).
142. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12184(a) (2001) (stating general rule for discrimina-
tion in certain transportation services); 42 U.S.C. § 12186(a)(1) (2001) (noting
general rule for regulations related to transportation issues).
143. Reply Brief For the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appel-
lants and Urging Reversal at 5, Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029
(9th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-56221), amended by 271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/lonbergrep.htm.
144. See Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1035 (demonstrating court can make logical
transference of liable parties). Even though section 302(a) only covers owners,
lessees, lessors and operators of public accommodations, the Court assumed that
commercial facilities are covered. See id.; see also Reply Brief For the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging Reversal at 5, Lonberg v.
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terms is inherently inconsistent with the court's general rule analy-
sis that the only liable parties are those named in the plain lan-
guage of section 302.145 The court's insistence on conforming its
holding to a flawed general rule analysis, however, results in limited
liability that is not supported by its textual reasoning.
146
B. Legislative History Analysis
In the legislation introduced to Congress in 1989, section
303(a) was not a separate provision governing new construction,
but rather a subsection of the general prohibition against discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability.' 47 At that time, the general prohi-
bition stated that "[n] o individual shall be discriminated against in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, on the basis of disability."'148 The proposed legis-
lation contained no language that limited liability to owners, opera-
tors, lessors or lessees.149
The Senate introduced an amendment to the proposed legisla-
tion that would create a separate section of the bill to address new
construction requirements.1 50 Section 303 was designated as the
new construction provision, whereas section 302 became the gen-
eral proscription against ADA noncompliance for public accommo-
dations. 151 The two categories of facilities covered by sections 302
and 303 are distinct - existing places of public accommodation ver-
sus newly constructed commercial facilities, each with its own stan-
Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-56221), amended by
271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/
lonbergrep.htm.
145. See 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding such interpreta-
tion violates maxim of statutory interpretation that courts should give effect to
statute's plain language).
146. See Reply Brief For the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellants and Urging Reversal at 8, Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d
1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-56221), amended by 271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/lonbergrep.htm.
147. See id. (citing S. 933, 101st Cong. § 402(a), (b) (6) (1989); and H.R. 2273,
101st Cong. § 402(a), (b)(6) (1989)).
148. Id.
149. See Colgate, supra note 38, at 156 (stating version of bill had no listing of
defendants).
150. See Reply Brief For the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellants and Urging Reversal at 6, Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d
1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-56221), amended by 271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/lonbergrep.htm.
151. See id. (citing S. 933, 101st Cong. §§ 302, 303 (1989)).
2002]
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dards for accessibility requirements. 152 This distinction highlights
the appropriateness of differentiating between categories of
defendants. 153
The legislative history, including floor debates, committee re-
ports and hearings, further substantiates Congress' intent against
limiting section 303 liability to the parties listed in section 302.154
An analysis of this history shows that Congress recognized that sec-
tion 303 covers architects and contractors, parties who design and
construct rather than own, operate or lease these facilities.1 55
Congress recognized that compliance at the early stages is nec-
essary and advantageous to decrease costs of litigation and retrofit-
ting.156  Courts applying a narrow interpretation based on
congressional intent analyses to exclude architects from section
303(a) liability, in essence, rely on "reasoning that could just as eas-
ily be used to arrive at opposite and more persuasive
interpretations."157
C. Courts' Approaches and Plaintiffs' Arguments
1. Significant Degree of Control Superior to Parallel Interpretation
The Ninth Circuit did not enthusiastically embrace the parallel
interpretation approach, but rather demonstrated a preference for
this approach because of the general rule analysis scheme.158 Be-
cause the parallel interpretation is not entirely consistent with the
court's reasoning, the court transferred terms to avoid a gap in cov-
erage of commercial facilities. 159 However, the Ninth Circuit did
not concede that the statute was ambiguous, as that would allow the
152. See Colgate, supra note 38, at 156 (discussing design and construction of
new facilities subject to rigid requirements).
153. See id.
154. See Reply Brief For the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellants and Urging Reversal at 6, Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d
1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-56221), amended by 271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001) avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/lonbergrep.htm.
155. See id.
156. See Colgate, supra note 38, at 162 (arguing that holding architects liable
serves as deterrent for noncompliance of ADA). Architect liability may result in
careful incorporation of ADA standards into the design of buildings, a greater
number of compliant facilities and fewer lawsuits. See id.
157. Id. at 156-57 (discussing courts' reliance on same arguments to reach
opposite conclusions in determining architect liability).
158. Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1034-35. Despite the court noting that "the evidence
does not perfectly align in its favor, this 'parallel interpretation'" is superior be-
cause it conforms to the general rule structure of the other titles of the ADA. Id. at
1034.
159. See Reply Brief For the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellants and Urging Reversal at 5, Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d
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plaintiffs' Chevron analysis argument, which defers to DOJ interpre-
tation. 160 The significant degree of control approach is preferred
because it centers around the problem of inaccessible design,
rather than on hypertextual scrutiny. 61 In addition, because of the
adjective "significant," many of the other courts' fears of extending
liability to subcontractors, suppliers, and so on are thwarted. 162
2. Deference to DOJ Interpretation
The Ninth Circuit chose not to defer to the DOJ regulations,
finding Congress' clear intent to limit section 303 (a) to owners, les-
sees, lessors and operators enumerated in section 302(a).163 Ironi-
cally, the courts in Illinois DIA and Ellerbe Becket relied on the same
argument - the intent of the statute is clear, and thus, deference to
DOJ interpretation is unwarranted - to reach the exact opposite
conclusion of Congress' clear intent for section 303(a) to not be
limited to the enumerated parties of section 302(a).164 Arguably,
because several courts have used the same intent argument to arrive
at opposite results, the statute may not be wholly unambiguous. 165
As such, agreement with the DOJ's interpretation, holding an archi-
tect liable for noncompliant design under section 303 (a), would be
appropiate.1 66
1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-56221), amended by 271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/lonbergrep.htm.
160. See Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2001),
amended by 271 F.3d 953, 954 (9th Cir. 2001) (declining to address Chevron argu-
ment because text and legislative history of ADA support conclusion that statute is
unambiguous).
161. See Lonberg 271 F.3d at 954.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. For an example of a Title III ADA case in which the Ninth Circuit
did defer to the DOJ's TAM, see generally Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d
827 (9th Cir. 2000).
165. See generally Colgate, supra note 38, at 145-46 (discussing congressional-
intent arguments in determining architect liability and noting either position sup-
ported with intent); William L. Killion & Gregory R. Mertz, Franchisor Liability for
Failure by Franchisees to Comply With the Americans With Disabilities Act: Uncertain State
of Law, 19 FRANCHIsE L.J. 141 (2000) (discussing intent argument in franchisor
liability); Powers & Berg, supra note 9, at 13 (examining opposing arguments ad-
dressing contractor, architect, and franchisor liability).
166. See Reply Brief For the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellants and Urging Reversal at 6, Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d
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3. Increased Litigation and Appropriate Injunctive Remedies
Responsibility of the architect can be addressed through
breach of contract litigation, indemnification clauses or other com-
mon law or statutory provisions. 167
A separate legal action against the architect by the building
owner being sued for noncompliance is an extra and burdensome
step in litigation, inconsistent with Congress' intent in passing the
ADA. 168 The drafters understood that retrofitting a building can be
very expensive; therefore, they required that new facilities be de-
signed and constructed to be accessible from the onset.1 69
The Ninth Circuit stated that injunctive relief is significant be-
cause architects are out of the picture. 170 Available injunctive relief
under the ADA includes a temporary, preliminary or permanent
order to make such facilities accessible. 171
VI: IMPACT
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Lonberg created a split with the
Eighth Circuit, the only other circuit court to address the issue of
liable parties, other than an owner, lessee, lessor and operator, for
noncompliance with the ADA.172 The district courts are left to
grapple with the diametrically opposed approaches of these circuit
courts' opinions, resulting in overwhelming inconsistency in the in-
terpretation of the ADA. 173
Lack ofjudicial uniformity trivializes the importance of accessi-
bility for people with disabilities, as well as underestimates the mag-
167. See Colgate, supra note 38, at 145 (discussing alternative remedies availa-
ble to those bringing claims).
168. See id. at 162 (discussing efficient allocation of resources by avoiding liti-
gation costs).
169. See id. Society saves the "dead-weight costs associated with rebuilding fa-
cilities constructed in non-compliance, ensuing litigation costs, and not having the
use of the structures during the reconstruction necessary to retrofit them with ac-
cessibility features." Id.
170. See Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1036.
171. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (noting strong deterrent effect against
noncompliance).
172. Compare United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. ("8th Circuit DIA'), 151
F.3d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding party who possesses significant degree of
control over design and construction of facility liable under Title III of ADA), with
Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1036 (holding architects are not liable under Title III of ADA).
See generally Howard Fisher, Disabled May Sue Architects Case Involves Wheelchairs, Amiz.
Bus. GAzETrE, Aug. 9, 2001, at 5.
173. Compare Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d 612, 617 (E.D. Ky. 1998), with Cali-
fornia DIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491, 493 (E.D. Cal., Jan. 12, 1998).
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nitude of the civil rights principles supporting the ADA. 174
Building a society accessible to people with disabilities is a key bene-
fit of the ADA. 175 Congress hoped that the ADA would serve as a
starting point to foster change in societal attitudes towards people
with disabilities.1 76 Unfortunately, many courts are not receptive to
the civil rights paradigm of the ADA and have not helped foster its
promotion.177
Under section 303, architects are proper defendants in a suit
alleging discrimination resulting from a noncompliant building de-
sign.1 78 Meeting the ADA guidelines at the design stage saves cost
and time, while satisfying the Congressional purpose. 179 The Ninth
Circuit's reasoning actually permits the design of new facilities that
are not accessible to people with disabilities, directly contravening
Title III's purpose.1 80
States have begun to address the issue of architect liability on
their own initiative. 181 For example, the Illinois Environmental
Barriers Act was amended to clarify for architects, builders, engi-
neers and building owners exactly what type of accessibility is re-
quired under the law. 182 Additionally, national recognition of the
critical obligations of architects and designers was apparent at the
Universal Accessibility Conference. 183 At the conference, over 400
architects, designers, advocates and other professionals interested
174. See Tucker, supra note 30, at 382.
175. See id. at 383.
176. See California DIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 493.
177. See Tucker, supra note 30, at 382 (discussing judicial backlash by examin-
ing decisions inconsistent with policy of ideals on which ADA is based).
178. See 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d at 822 (holding party who possesses signifi-
cant degree of control over design and construction of facility liable under Title III
of ADA).
179. See Colgate, supra note 38, at 162. Huge costs in litigation and retrofit-
ting would be spared with compliant design. See id.
180. See H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. II, at 34 (1990).
181. See, e.g., National Association of Attorneys General: Civil Rights Update,
Disability Rights Development, NAAG Civ. RTS. UPDATE 14 (Spring 1997).
182. See id. An advocacy council consisting of people with disabilities, code
officials, architects and attorneys helped craft the bill. See id. The bill, Illinois-SB
1594, authored by Attorney General Jim Ryan, "aimed at bringing Illinois access
law into conformance with the American with Disabilities Act." Id. Ironically, de-
pending on what circuit decision is followed, this particular aim may or may not be
an issue. Compare 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d at 822, with Lonberg 259 F.3d 1029, 1036
(9th Cir. 2001); see also Illinois DIA, 997 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 (C.D. Ill. 1998)
(describing Illinois district court decision to hold franchisor and parent company
liable for ADA violations).
183. See Universal Accessibility Conference Hailed a Success, 3 No.4 AccEss
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in accessible design participated in various sessions that included
ADA risk management and liability, new construction requirements
in ADA Accessibility Guidelines and access to historic facilities. i8 4
Society, therefore, has begun to recognize the significance of
an accessible design. The result is notjust a theater, stadium, arena
or hotel, but a far-reaching civil rights implication of an accessible
society. It is due time that judicial decisions reflect the messages
that have founded the very ideals of our nation. We have praised
our leaders and our legislators who have taken us two steps forward
to an accessible society. It would be unfortunate if our judiciary
takes us two steps back. The formalistic approach of the Ninth Cir-
cuit should not be used in a civil rights context, instead, the Eighth
Circuit's functional approach in interpreting the ADA should be
embraced.
Mita Chattejee
184. See id. Sponsored by the Access Board and the American Institute of
Architects, Attorney General Janet Reno provided the keynote address. See id. In
her remarks, she stressed that to vigorously enforce the ADA "you have an obliga-
tion to produce designs that provide full and equal access to all .... If we have
to, and I don't want to, but I am prepared to, we will litigate, and litigate vigor-
ously." Id.
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